Zero inflation and over-dispersion issues can significantly affect the predicted probabilities as well as lead to unreliable estimations in count data models. This paper investigates whether considering this issue for German Socioeconomic Panel (1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995), used by Riphahn et al (2003), provides any evidence of misspecification in their estimated models for adverse selection and moral hazard effects in health demand market The paper has the following contributions: first, it shows that estimated parameters for adverse selection and moral hazard effects are sensitive to the model choice; second, the random effects panel data as well as standard pooled data models do not provide reliable estimates for health care demand (doctor visits); third, it shows that by appropriately accounting for zero inflation and over-dispersion there is no evidence of adverse selection behaviour and that moral hazard plays a positive and significant role for visiting more doctors. These results are robust for both males and females' subsamples as well as for the full data sample.
Introduction and literature review
, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , and Bundorf et al.( 2005) , respectively, delineate the effect of moral hazard, adverse selection, and income effect in health insurance markets. A number of studies have investigated these effects, though sometimes different econometric methodologies led to different interpretations about the effects of similar data.
Following the model developed by Cameron et al. (1988) , Rephahn et al (2003) we estimate the demand for doctor and hospital visits for the German Socioeconomic Panel data (GSOEP, 1984 (GSOEP, -1995 .
The findings of this study suggest that adverse selection, where a high-risk individual buys more insurance coverage, affects positively the number of doctor and hospital visits for only the males' hospital demand.
Moral hazard, where an insured individual uses more health care services because of its lower cost, does not have any significant effect on any of the above health-care demands. Among other studies that looked at the effect of asymmetry information on health care demand are the studies of Chiappori and Salani (2000) that examined adverse selection using German data, while Geil et al. (1997) and Cameron et al. (1988) investigate moral hazard using Australian data.
In their theoretical model, Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991) delineate that wealth can ambiguously affect health-care demand. Their empirical results, however, indicate that both "bequeathable" and "nonbequeathable" wealth substantially increase the demand for both supplementary health care and health expenditure. Data reveals that those who enrolled for supplementary insurance, on average, had 50 percent higher wealth. They estimate the effect of moral hazard in a health expenditure model and use its estimated error term as a proxy for unexplained expenditure in their health care demand model. Its significant coefficient indicate the existence of selection effect.
For U.S. data, Marvasti (2014) finds that the demand for services of doctors is neither income elastic nor price elastic. As Marvasti discusses, however, Bago d'Uva and Jones' (2009) latent hurdle model confirms a positive income effect on the number of visiting doctors for European data. Amponsah (2013) confirms moral hazard and adverse selection for Ghanaian health care, and finds that an individual in a higher income group to be more likely to buy health insurance (income effect). His study confirms the income effect found in Asante and Aikins (2008) and Kirigia et al. (2005) . Keane and Stavrunova (2016) use a simultaneous equation model to jointly investigate adverse selection and moral hazard for the U.S. supplemental health-insurance market, namely Medigap. They extend previous studies by employing a smooth mixture of the Tobit model to control for heterogeneity, and by capturing the correlation between unobservable factors that affect both health insurance demand and health expenditure. Although they find a negligible adverse selection into Medigap, the insurance coverage leads to a significant rise in health care utilization and its related costs (moral hazard).
Conditional on the supplemental insurance and health status, income has a small effect on health expenditure (See Cardon and Hendel (2001) and Bajari et al. (2011 Bajari et al. ( , 2014 for other health market structural models).
To deal with inflated zeros in health care demand variables, researchers rely on different approaches. Powell and Goldman (2016) control for zero medical care expenditure and its heavily-skewed distribution by employing a quantile treatment effect framework (see Powell (2014) ). The framework estimates an unconditional distribution for health care expenditures by assuming no adverse selection.
They compare this distribution with the observed health expenditure distribution to estimate adverse selection effects. After separating moral hazard and adverse selection, each factor almost explains half of the reason for higher medical expenditure of a most generous plan compared to a least one.
With around 90% and 35% zeros for the number of doctor visits and hospital visits, the results of Rephahn et al (2003) can also suffer from over-dispersion by not taking them into account. To mitigate the random effects, they mix a Poisson distribution with log-normal distribution; however, the approach may not account for the over-dispersion. In this paper, we estimate different versions of generalized standard distributions and zero-inflated models discussed by Harris et al (2014) and Hilb (2011) .
We investigate how accounting for inflated zeros impacts the effects of moral hazard effects and adverse selection, which affects how individuals allocate their income to health care. We examine the importance of over-dispersion in the data, and select the model that results in more accurate predictions for the data from Rephahn et al (2003) . Comparing with Rephahn et al (2003) , the selected Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial2 (ZINB2) model estimates the impact of the adverse selection and moral hazard on health-care demand in a consistent way.
A number of papers have extended the application of zero-inflated models. Greene (1994) considers the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB). As Ainsworth (2007) argues, ZINB model is used by Neal and Gaher (2006) to study drug use issues among college students; Gupta et al (1996) and Famoye and Singh (2006) apply a zero-inflated Generalize Poisson model to study frequentist setting. Ainsworth (2007) points out that Zero-inflated models have been further developed, in Ecology, by Ridout et al (1998) , Martin et al (2005) and Kuhnert et al (2005) to explain different kinds of zeros: those that are structural as well as those that depend on the study. Hill (2011) provides details of other papers, for example, Cohen (1960) , Johnson et al (2005) for underscore zeros, Mekerssoon and Roth (2000) , Li et al (2003) for situations where data have inflated zero 1 .
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the different methodologies that are employed in this paper. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis, and section 4 provides the results of different model specifications. Section 5 evaluates the predictions of the employed models, and section 6 reviews robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
1 As will be discussed in following sections, recently various extensions of zero-inflated models have been emphasised by Haris et al (2014) and are incorporated in STATA. More details about some of these models are discussed in Hilb (2011) . While, STATA is not able to provide panel data estimates for zero-inflated models, LIMDEP is able to estimate fixed effect and random effect models in this context.
Methodology

Discussion of Over Dispersion
In what follows we discuss the importance of properly accounting for over dispersion when it is present in count data models such as the ones used to model doctor and hospital visits. As Hilb (2011) 
Count data models
A Poisson model with equal mean and variance, ( ) = ( ) = , has no power in dealing with over-dispersion. To make it more flexible, the model can be augmented with other distributions. This is done by relating its mean to an individual unobserved effect ( ). We can obtain different extensions of the Poisson model depending on how we specify the distribution for . Appendix B, Table B1, provides an extensive discussion about these extensions. A Generalized Poisson (GP) model can also accommodate both over-dispersion and under-dispersion. We use these distributions to discuss the robustness of the results in the analysed data.
Zero-inflated count models
Data with more zeros than what we expect from a particular distribution may be a suspect of overdispersion. Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models adjust for excessive zeros in the response. Hilbe et al (2014) discuss different versions of zero-inflated models.
The mixture framework of these distributions can explain more of over-dispersion in the data.
Appendix B, Table B2 , presents different zero-inflated distributions that are used as robustness checks for our analysis. Following Hilbe (2011), a Vuong (1989) test 3 for non-nested models is used to compare the suitability of a zero-inflated distribution against its standard distribution as in Table B1 . If Vuong test is positive and significant, the zero-inflated model is preferred to its corresponding standard one. With negative and significant value, the standard model is the selected one. With a non-significant Vuong test, none of them is preferred to the other one. As an additional check, we look at the predictability of different model specifications.
Data description
We use the same data as in Rephahn et al (2003) that is "the first twelve annual waves (1984 through 1995) (2003), the dependent variables are defined as "the number of visits to a doctor within the last quarter prior to the survey, and the number of inpatient hospital visits with at least one night spent in the hospital within a given calendar year". Table 1 shows the presence of inflated-zeros in both hospital visits and doctor visits for both genders.
Around 92% and 44% of males did not visit a hospital and a doctor. For females, the shares of zero hospital and doctor visit are around 90% and 30%, respectively. The abundance of zeros in both kinds of visits suggests that zero-inflated distributions might be better options rather than their standard versions for the purpose of examining doctor and hospital demands. Since the frequency of zeros for doctor visits is less than for hospital visits, this paper focuses on the demand equation for doctor visits. If the results for this equation confirm the superiority of zero-inflated distributions over their standard versions, the results can be extended to demand for hospital visits as well. Among the explanatory variables, Rephahn et al (2003) consider two different dummy variables for two types of insurance: whether an individual has public insurance or not, and, if yes whether he or she has an add-on insurance policy, which is an optional policy to cover some other costs. They argue that 90% of German people have mandatory insurance policy with only 1% without any insurance.
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Panel Data Models
On the demand side, Rephahn et al (2003) assume a bivariate model for the demands of doctor and hospital visits. These demands follow a Poisson distribution, and the unobservable heterogeneity and error terms follow lognormal and bivariate normal distributions, respectively:
∼ � � = 1,2 (with 1 for doctor visits and 2 for hospital visits)
To integrate out the unobserved heterogeneity , a Gauss-Hermite approximation was used, while to integrate the distribution of cross-equation errors � � a modified Gauss-Legendre approach was applied.
Rephahn et al (2003) use the public insurance dummy to check for moral hazard and the add-on insurance dummy to check for adverse selection. The results indicate no evidence of moral hazard for demands for doctor visits and hospital visits: the coefficient of public insurance dummy are statistically insignificant and negative for male's hospital demand. Their model estimates positive coefficients for addons for both demands, though it is statistically significant only for males' hospital demand and confirming adverse selection for it. Also they found that self-employed females and males have fewer visits to doctors than other employees.
Random effects model
As mentioned above, Riphahn Overall (2003) do control for unobserved effects by mixing Poisson distributions, however, their model lacks accounting for the inflated zeros in the data. Consequently, by taking into account this issue one can provide more reliable estimated parameters for add-on and public insurance variables.
To reconcile our analysis with Rephahn et al (2003), we first estimate random effects models for doctor visits using a Gaussian distribution and a Gamma distribution to account for the unobserved heterogeneity. For the purpose of comparing our model with their model, we focus on the estimated coefficients for public insurance and add-on insurance dummies. Table 2 reports the doctor visits' results for both females and males. Based on AIC and BIC criteria, we see that Gamma distribution is a better choice for the data. Also, with Gamma distribution the coefficient of public insurance is positive and statistically significant for both females and males while in the case of Gaussian distribution both of them are positive but insignificant. For both models, the coefficient of add-on is negative but not significant. The results show that, although it seems that Gaussian distribution is more flexible than Gamma, NB2 (a mixture of Poisson and Gamma) is a better option for this data. Standard errors in parentheses Source, German Socioeconomic Panel (1984 -1995 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard count models:
Following Greene (2008), we use pooled data to select the best model between standard models. The results for Poisson, NB1 and NB2 are the same as in Greene (2008) . Based on the dispersion criteria which has a high dispersion value of 6.67, Poisson distribution is not suitable. NB2 defeats Poisson by reducing considerably the value of dispersion to 1.99. This can also be confirmed by ln( ) = 0.561 which measures the logarithm of the dispersion parameter ( ) and based on the likelihood ratio test is statistically significant. The same conclusion is obtained for other distribution: NB1, Generalized Poisson, NB Famoye and NB. Using AIC and BIC criteria, the NB Waring model is the best model for these data.
It is followed by the Generalized Poisson, NB1, NB2, and NB Famoye.
NB Waring model estimates a positive and significant coefficient for the add-on insurance. In addition this parameter is positive in all models but only significant in NB1 and Generalized Poisson and NB Waring models. The estimated parameter for public insurance is positive in all the models but statistically insignificant. Table A2 in the appendix A reports all parameter estimates. 
Zero-inflated models (Pooled data)
Following Greene (2008) again, we use pooled data to select the best model among zero-inflated models introduced in Table B2 . Since for the zero inflated models it is necessary to specify the inflation function, all the explanatory variables are covariates in this function. Table 5 provides estimation results related to zero-inflated models for males. Based on the positive and statistically significant values of Vuong statistics (the test for non-nested models), there is a strong evidence to prefer the zero-inflated models to their corresponding standard models. Also, add-on contributes to the over-dispersion in the data as it is significant in the zero-inflated function. The ZeroInflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) Waring model has the lowest AIC and BIC values followed by ZINB2
ZINB-Famoye and zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP). The statistically significant estimated parameters related to dispersion in ZINB Waring and ZINB2 indicate that zero-inflated Poisson is not a good choice for these data and its significant coefficient for add-on is not reliable. The estimated parameters for add-on are negative for all of the models but statistically insignificant except for ZIP. Moreover, the public insurance coefficient is positive and statistically significant ZIP and ZINB2. Table 6 provides the results of zero-inflated models for females. The results for females are similar to those for males. In the case of females, the coefficient for public insurance is statistically positive for ZINB2 model. Figure 1a and Figure respectively. In addition, the zero-inflated models provide some improvements on the estimation of other numbers of doctor visits. 6 Since the predicted values might not be integers, we convert them to the closest integer. Table 7 compares four models based on the maximum differences and mean absolute differences between predicted and actual counts. The results show that Poisson performs worst at predicting the 0s, and NB2 and ZIP perform worst at predicting the 1s, while ZINB2 is worst at predicting the 2s. However, the maximum difference and mean of absolute differences are much lower for ZINB2 which means this model is the best one in terms of overall prediction. The Pearson statistic equals 193.429 for this model (the lowest of all models), which confirms it is the best model in terms of prediction (see table A8 in the appendix A for more details). Figure 2 presents the density comparison between actual and predicted probabilities. Again, we see that ZINB2 is superior to ZIP in predicting actual probabilities. Further, Figure 3 plots the residuals from the tested models. Small residuals indicate a good fit, so the models with lines closest to zero should be considered as the suitable ones. We can see that the residuals line for ZINB2 is very close to zero when compared with the line of residuals for all the other models, confirming the results of all previous findings. Finally, Table 8 provides tests for choosing the best model in terms of fit statistics such as AIC and BIC as well as Vuong statistic. The results also indicate that ZINB2 is the best model among the models under consideration. 
Predicted versus realizations comparisons
Robustness Checks
Robustness results on pooled sample
The results of previous sections show that zero-inflated NB2 could be considered a suitable model in terms of prediction for both female and male subsamples. The model predicts that public insurance has a positive and statistically significant coefficient for both subsamples, which has implications on the income effects of individuals.
Now, we check if we can get the same results as before by pooling males and females data. We add a dummy variable with value of 1 for females and value of 0 for males to the explanatory variables.
Consequently, six different models for the whole sample are estimated: Poisson with Gaussian random effect, Poisson with Gamma random effect, NB2, NB Waring, zero-inflated NB2 as well as zero-inflated NB Waring. Table 9 reports the estimation results for the six models. In all of them the estimated coefficients for females are positive and statistically different from zero which confirms our focusing on two separate samples for males and females in the previous sections. It also means that on average, ceteris paribus; females will demand more visits for doctors than males. Between the random effect models, the one with Gamma distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity performs best (both AIC and BIC are predicting the same result). However, all the pooled data models are preferred to random-effect models. Further, the Voung statistic used to compare non-nested models is positive and statistically significant for the zeroinflated models, meaning that zero-inflated models provide better predictions than their standard counterparts. Furthermore, based on AIC and BIC, the zero-inflated Waring model, though less accurate in convergence, is preferred to the zero-inflated NB2. Finally, all the models estimate a positive coefficient for public insurance and are statistically significant except for the Gaussian random effect model. The results confirms the existence of moral hazard. We also jointly estimate both doctor visits and hospital visits using a bivariate NB model to account for potential correlation between the two events. As Riphahn et al (2003) explain, doctor visits and hospital visits are positively correlated. However, this correlation should be identified and tested.
In the males sample we find a correlation between doctor visits and hospital visits of 0.1477. Using only non-zero values, this correlation reduces to 0.1138. Cameron and Trividi (2013) show how to construct a statistic for testing the independency between two counts specific regressions (for doctor visits and hospital visits). The calculated test statistic for our sample are 9.47, 1.05, 0.05, 0.94, respectively for ( , ) = (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), (2,2). Only the first value is statistically different from zero (with p-vale equal to 0.002). This shows that independency can only be rejected for the first statistics suggesting some evidence of weak dependency between the two count variables. This is in contrast to what Riphahn et al (2003) expected. Motivated by the first test value, however, a bivariate NB2 model is estimated for males using pooled panel data (see Table 10 ). Here the parameter can capture both overdispersion as well as correlation between unobserved heterogeneity8.
For females, the correlation between doctor visits and hospital visits for all data realizations is estimated for female. The results are presented in Table 10 .
We see that the parameters are significant in both male and female bivariate models. This result might confirm the previous results that NB2 based models are a better distribution for explaining real data, rather than Poisson distribution. Here we find that the estimated public insurance parameters for doctor visits are positive and statistically significant for both males and females while for hospital visits are negative and insignificant. Although estimated add-on parameters are positive for all males and females in two equations, they are statistically insignificant. 
Conclusion
The high share of zeros for a dependent variable in a count data regression model can severely increase the over-dispersion issue and lead to unreliable estimators. We show that the German suffers severely from over-dispersion issue and their estimation based on standard distributions might not be reliable. Results based on standard distributions are close to Riphahn et al (2003) and, overall, there is not enough evidence for moral hazard and adverse selection except for Waring NB2, which presents a positive effect from adverse selection on the number of doctor visits.
However, this result might also not be reliable due to the over-dispersion that resulted in the high share of zeros in the data. Overall we show that within the class of random effect models, the model with a Gamma distribution for unobserved heterogeneity is more suitable than the one assuming Gaussian distribution for unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast to Riphahn et al (2003) , most of the zero-inflated distribution models predict a negative but insignificant coefficient for add-on insurance for both male and female subsamples.
This results indicate a weak sign of adverse selection. We find a positive coefficient for public insurance in all the estimated models, but only statistically significant for ZINB2, the best model, for both genders. This result confirms the existence of moral hazard in the insurance market.
Although we show that the correlation between the demand for doctor and hospital is weak in the data, our bivariate NB model finds a positive and significant coefficient for public insurance and a positive and significant for add-on insurance for doctor's visit. This is also in contrast with the results by Riphahn et al (2003) , who do not find any significant coefficient for the public insurance for doctor's visit in their bivariate model. Overall, our results find a strong evidence for moral hazard for visiting more doctors. The results provide significant evidence of how considering the over-dispersion nature of the data in the estimation process can provide more precise estimations and reveal a better understanding about health demand components. -42774.7 -27410.0 -27480.4 -27327.5 -27480.4 -27240.3 Standard errors in parentheses Source, German Socioeconomic Panel (1984 -1995 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses Source, German Socioeconomic Panel (1984 -1995 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
